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In Twentieth Century America, it is widely accepted that parents can
be compelled to send their children to public schools, or their legal
equivalent,' for the major part of their childhood. But does the state have
a free hand in dictating the content of the education the child receives, the
manner in which it is delivered, the rules and regulations governing the
educational enterprise, and the extent to which access to alternative view-
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OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (L. Levy & K. Karst eds. forthcoming). A somewhat different
version of this Article was also presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Re-
search Association in San Francisco, in April, 1986. The author wishes to acknowledge the very able
research assistance of Stephen A. Hess, law student at the University of Colorado School of Law.
I was delighted to learn that the Yale Law Journal planned an issue honoring Professor Charles L.
Black on his retirement from teaching at Yale Law School, and I am most appreciative of the oppor-
tunity the editors have given me to contribute to the issue. Had I dreamed when I was a student in his
class in constitutional law that I would myself go into legal education, I would have noted then that
Charles Black was the perfect role model for a teacher. He was compassionate, stimulating, engaged,
concerned with fairness, and made one care about the law not only as an intellectual exercise, but also
for the role it could play in bringing about a more just society. One of my classmates (now also in
legal education) commented after class one afternoon that he had finally decided what he wanted to be
when he grew up-Charles Black. If we did not realize then that he was to be our role model for a
teacher and scholar, we already knew that he was our role model for a human being. It is a privilege
to be asked by the editors to write an essay on law and the schools in honor of my friend and mentor
for nearly a quarter of a century.
* R. WATERS, JOHN SELDEN AND HIs TABLE-TALK 174 (1899).
1. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (West 1968) (replacing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:14-14
(West 1965)), requiring each child to attend either the state public schools or "a day school in which
there is given instruction equivalent to that provided in the public schools. . . or to receive equivalent
instruction elsewhere than at school." The language, "equivalent instruction elsewhere than at
school," from the predecessor of that law has been interpreted to require only a showing of academic
equivalence for non-school instruction. State v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 390, 231 A.2d 252, 257
(Morris County Ct. 1967).
1647
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 1647, 1986
points is permitted? Courts have played an increasing role in this area,
trying to strike a balance between the rights of the individual (parent or
child) and the interests of the state. Basic to any discussion of the role of
courts in educational decision-making is the primacy of education in
American ideology.2 Americans believe that education is central to the re-
alization of a truly democratic and egalitarian society. It is through educa-
tion that the skills necessary to exercise the responsibilities of citizenship
and to benefit from the opportunities of a free economy will be imparted,
no matter how recently arrived or previously disadvantaged the individual.
The Supreme Court shares the generally accepted view that the mission
of our educational institutions is to transmit society's common values and
beliefs to the next generation,3 including those essential to participation in
a democracy." This, one assumes, must include such constitutional values
as freedom of expression, freedom to worship as one wishes, and the right
to privacy, among other important individual rights. The Supreme Court
has also indicated that democratic norms cannot be taught in an institu-
tion that suppresses democratic values: The fact that schools "are educat-
ing the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Consti-
tutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind
at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our gov-
ernment as mere platitudes."5 However, while students do not "shed their
2. The essence of the American common school, even by 1950, was a school "providing students of
diverse backgrounds with a minimsim common educational experience, involving the intellectual and
moral training necessary to the responsible and intelligent exercise of citizenship." L. CREMIN, THE
AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL 219 (1951).
3. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, in which the Court acknowledges the importance of the public
schools "in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the
values on which our society rests . . . ." 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979). See also Board of Educ., Island
Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, noting that "there is a legitimate and substantial
community interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or
political." 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 10). Many
states require both moral and "patriotic" instruction in the public school curriculum. See, e.g., N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 801 (McKinney 1969) ("In order to promote a spirit of patriotic and civic service and
obligation and to foster in the children of the state moral and intellectual qualities which are essential
in preparing to meet the obligations of citizens . . ., the regents . . . shall prescribe courses of in-
struction in patriotism and citizenship .... "); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 13-33-6 (1982):
[T]here shall be given . . . special moral instruction intended to impress upon the minds of
students the importance of truthfulness, temperance, purity, public spirit, patriotism, respect
for honest labor, obedience to parents, respect for the contributions of minority and ethnic
groups to the heritage of South Dakota, and due deference to old age.
See also id. at § 13-33-5 (patriotic instruction required).
4. If education is essential to the maintenance of a democratic form of government, one wonders
why the Framers failed to make it either a federal responsibility or a constitutional right. Cf. U.S.S.R.
CONSr. art. 45 ("Citizens of the USSR have the right to education.").
The responsibility of the state for education developed slowly. In colonial times, the Puritans and
others regarded it as appropriate for the state to establish schools, but the state was acting principally
on behalf of the church; education was in the service of religion. The Anglicans, on the other hand,
thought education was not the business of the state. Thus, at the time of the drafting of the Constitu-
tion, there was no uniformly accepted view of the role of state schools or state-compelled education.
5. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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constitutional rights ...at the schoolhouse gate,"' the Supreme Court
has indicated that the "special characteristics of the school environment"
may limit the reach of constitutional protections. Thus the very nature of
the process of inculcating values in those who are not yet adults appar-
ently necessitates that the constitutional rights of both teachers and stu-
dents be somewhat circumscribed.
The dilemma is clear: Education necessarily involves the process of se-
lection, but it also requires some degree of order within the institution to
carry out the educational mission. On the other hand, if the educational
institution is wholly undemocratic, students are likely to get mixed signals
with regard to the democratic values needed to function as citizens in our
society: The way in which school administrators operate schools may have
a more powerful influence on students than the lessons in their civics text-
books. Socialization to values through a uniform educational experience
necessarily conflicts with freedom of choice and the diversity of a pluralis-
tic society. Recent cases reflect this conflict between creating a protected
environment for the transmission of society's democratic values and the
message that such an environment-where the rights of the individual are
given less emphasis than the need for order and control-conveys to stu-
dents. The courts have failed to articulate clear guidelines for reconciling
this conflict.8
The mission of schools as the transmitters of social, moral, and political
values makes it inevitable that disputes will arise over which values are to
be inculcated and who is authorized to make these decisions. There is no
consensus, for example, on whether schools should emphasize a common
language, history, and culture promoting assimilationist and national
norms, or emphasize pluralism and diversity. Should the primary goal of
education be to enhance the self-realization of the student or to mold the
student to advance the common goals of society? Until the middle of the
twentieth century, these policy choices were almost solely the prerogative
of school administrators and local boards of education.9 Today, however,
various competing groups and individuals-school boards, school adminis-
trators, teachers, parents, students, community leaders, minority groups,
and federal and state agencies-seek to control education decision-making,
6. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
7. Id.
8. The state clearly may use the "public schools [to] . . .inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary
to the maintenance of a democratic political system ...." Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77
(1979). On the other hand, school officials may not "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .... " West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
9. That children, in certain contexts, have constitutional rights not subject to abridgement by gov-
ernment was not clearly established until 1967. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone").
1649
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 1647, 1986
to have a say in which values are transmitted and how. Their struggles
for control have often ended up in the courts.10
As the courts have attempted to outline the nature and extent of the
constraints placed upon school authorities by the Constitution, some peo-
ple have expressed the growing concern that the schools are becoming "le-
10. Since Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court has decided cases
involving constitutional claims that touch on nearly every major area of educational policy. See, e.g.,
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (school curriculum); Board of Educ., Island Trees Union
Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (removal of books from school libraries);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (student rights of ex-
pression and non-disruptive protest); Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (same); Pick-
ering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (teacher rights of expression); Mount Healthy City
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(exemptions from state compulsory school attendance laws); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rod-
riguiz, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (school finance reform); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
(school desegregation); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (same); Washington v.
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (same); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)
(reorganization of school district boundaries to undo segregation); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974) (school personnel policies); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
(academic freedom); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (students' rights of expression and associa-
tion); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (student association rights); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960) (teacher association rights); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer in public
schools); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (same); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479
(1985) (same); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student discipline); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651 (1977) (same); Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (academic dismissal);
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (search of student for evidence of rules infraction);
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (discrimination in admission to schools
or programs on basis of gender); Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1977), affirming by an
equally divided Court, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976) (same); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)
(liability of school officials for violating rights of students); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)
(nature of damages, once liability found).
The Supreme Court has also dealt with issues involving discrimination in the education of the
handicapped, Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984), Board of Educ. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176 (1982), and of those with limited English proficiency, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974), in resolving federal statutory claims.
Earlier in this century, the Supreme Court decided landmark cases involving issues of compulsory
public schooling, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), state regulation of private schools,
Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and coerced
professions of belief in public schools, West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
The involvement in questions of educational policy on the part of lower federal courts and state
courts has been even more pervasive. See, e.g., Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981)
(minimum competency testing); Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th
Cir. 1974) (discrimination on basis of gender and race in admission to schools); United States v. North
Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.C. 1975) (teacher certification); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (failure to provide appropriate education
for handicapped); Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971) (unequal resources for poor
and minority school children); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (tracking and ability grouping); Peter W.
v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976) ("educational
malpractice"); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376
(1979) (same).
The intervention of the courts has largely been concerned with either the appropriate balance be-
tween individual liberties and societal interests or protecting the right of equal access to an education.
See generally KIRP & YUDOF's EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW (M. Yudof, D. Kirp, T. van
Geel & B. Levin eds. 2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW] (ex-
amining shift in decision-making of educational policy from local to state and federal levels of govern-
ment, and assessing impact of these changes on educational policy and practice).
1650
Educating Youth
Free School District No. 26 v. Pico,21 the Court has noted the state's
considerable interest in inculcating democratic values and traditions. Sev-
eral commentators have recently addressed this issue. Each has looked at
the role of the government versus the rights of the individual and con-
cluded that the constitutional rights of the individual student (or teacher)
and his or her parents should be given greater weight than the interest of
the state, but each commentator has relied on different reasons. For Pro-
fessor Yudof, protection of the rights of free speech, press, religion, and
academic freedom requires limiting the power of government to indoctri-
nate the young.22 "The power to teach, inform, and lead is also the power
to indoctrinate, distort judgment, and perpetuate the current regime,"2
whether in the school or the outside world. He even sees Pierce v. Society
of Sisters as a decision limiting the power of government to indoctrinate,
whether consciously on the part of the Court or not: "A contrary decision
in Pierce would have fostered a state monopoly in education, a monopoly
that would dangerously strengthen the state's ability to mold the young." '24
Professor Kamenshine goes beyond Professor Yudof and rejects the notion
that society has any interest in the schools inculcating "political" values,
inasmuch as there are no "uniformly acceptable" political values. For this
reason, groups outside the school (family, religious organizations, etc.) are
more suitable for instilling values in youth.25 Overriding any such argua-
ble societal interest, Professor Kamenshine asserts, is a fundamental inter-
est in preventing political establishments. He therefore argues for an im-
plied political establishment prohibition analogous to the establishment of
religion prohibition. 2 Finally, Professor van Geel, in a recent article, ar-
gues that schools need to show a compelling interest supporting the exer-
cise of power to inculcate values in order to override the interest in the
freedom of student belief.27 He argues further that social science research
suggests that schools could not make such a showing.28
The approach taken in this Article, however, is to assume that the gov-
ernment does have an important interest in inculcating the values and tra-
ditions of our society. My argument for giving greater weight to individ-
ual rights and freedoms than the courts have done thus far is that without
such protection schools' attempts to inculcate the values of a democratic
21. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (for discussion of case, see infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text).
22. Yudof, supra note 14, at 874-91.
23. Id. at 865.
24. Id. at 890.
25. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L.
RF.v. 1104, 1134 (1979).
26. Id. at 1132-38.
27. van Geel, supra note 12.
28. Id.
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society will be unsuccessful."9 The courts have often balanced the need to
inculcate values against the protection of individual rights, yet it is the
constitutional values that form the basis of the individual rights that soci-
ety wishes to inculcate. The argument here is that if educational institu-
tions are not subject to the same constitutional constraints as other govern-
mental agencies,"0 students will not come to an understanding of the value
of a democratic, participatory society, but instead will become a passive,
alienated citizenry that believes that government is arbitrary. My argu-
ment is reinforced by research suggesting that democratic values are
taught to youth by more than formal instruction, particularly where the
formal instruction is inconsistent with the students' observations and
experience.31
In this Article I will identify some points of tension in the effort to
inculcate democratic values, and will discuss the lessons being taught to
students when the balance is struck in favor of the educational institution
rather than individual rights.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE INCULCATION OF RELIGIOUS,
POLITICAL, AND MORAL VALUES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
There has been much litigation regarding the constitutional limits on
the inculcation of religious, political, and moral values in the public
schools, both in terms of what values should be inculcated and who should
make those decisions. Indeed, it is argued that the decision of schools not
to inculcate certain ethical, moral, and religious values inculcates other
values: A value-free education is not possible. The charge that schools are
actively promoting "secular humanism" is based on this 
argument.3 2
29. Cf Cohen & Lazerson, Education and the Corporate Order, in POWER AND IDEOLOGY IN
EDUCATION 373-86, 382-86 (J. Karabel & A. Halsey eds. 1977) (students cannot learn democracy in
school because school is not democratic).
30. Justice Rehnquist, however, would distinguish the government in its role as educator from the
government in its role as sovereign. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 904 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. See, e.g., R. WEISSBERG, POLITICAL LEARNING, POLITICAL CHOICE, AND DEMOCRATIC
CITIZENSHIP (1974); R. DAWSON & K. PREWITr, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION (1969); Litt, Civic
Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination, 28 AMER. SOC. REV. 69 (1963).
One theory is that the child's early life experiences in the family and in the school affects his or her
relationships toward authority. If the family or school is authoritarian and the children do not partici-
pate in decision-making, the children learn to be submissive to authority. A more democratic family or
school is thought to predispose children to democratic values. R. HESS & J. TORNEY, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF POLITICAL ATI~TUDES IN CHILDREN 93-115 (1967). Another study emphasizes that the
most important aspect of political socialization is the atmosphere of the classroom-whether it is
democratic or authoritarian. One "fosters attitudes and skills consonant with democratic values;" the
other fosters hierarchical values and "deference to power." R. DAWSON & K. PREWiTT, supra, at
165-66. But see Merelman, Democratic Politics and the Culture of American Education, 74 AM.
POL. SmI. REV. 319 (1980) (discussing weaknesses in school's socialization of democratic values).
32. See Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1534 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 85 (1985) (challenge to assignment of book as constituting governmental promotion of
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Religious values. The principal cases resolving the question of the
proper place of religion in the curriculum of the public schools-that is,
the extent to which school authorities constitutionally may socialize their
students to religious values-were decided in the early 1960's. The devel-
opment of the law in this area illustrates well the tensions between parent
and state in the educational enterprise. The concern on one hand is
whether the school-a government agency-should be conducting a reli-
gious program and, on the other hand, whether the total omission of reli-
gion from the schools may itself be teaching children something about the
role of religion that is contrary to the message their parents want taught.
The Supreme Court has taken a very restrictive view toward any at-
tempt on the part of school authorities to inculcate religious values. In
Engel v. Vitale,3 the Court held that a non-denominational prayer writ-
ten by the New York Board of Regents for use in the public schools vio-
lated the First Amendment's prohibition of an establishment of religion. A
year later, in School District v. Schempp, 4 the Supreme Court struck
down the practice of reading verses from the Bible and the recitation of
the Lord's Prayer in public schools, holding that the state's obligation to
be neutral with regard to religion forbids it to conduct a religious service
even with the consent of the majority of those affected. 5 Justice Clark
was careful, however, to distinguish between the study of religion or of the
Bible "when presented objectively as part of a secular program of educa-
tion" and religious exercises.3 Not until 1980 did the Supreme Court
deal with another school prayer case. In Stone v. Graham,37 the Court
held violative of the establishment clause a Kentucky law that required
that the Ten Commandments be posted on the walls of public school
classrooms in the state, because the law had "no secular legislative pur-
pose."38 The Court again indicated, however, that the case would be dif-
ferent if the Ten Commandments were integrated into the school's curric-
ulum, where the Bible could be studied as history, ethics, or comparative
religion.3"
secular humanism as religionl.
33. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In an often-quoted statement, Justice Black said that the establishment
clause "must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to composeofficial prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried
on by government." Id. at 425.
34. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
35. Id. at 225-26.
36. Id. at 225.
37. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
38. Id. at 41.
39. Id. at 42. In the most recent school prayer case, Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985),the Court struck down an Alabama statute authorizing a period of "meditation or voluntary prayer"as not reflecting a clear secular purpose and as thus violating the first Lemon test. Id. at 2491-92. Itshould be noted that most of the establishment clause cases have arisen in the context of public aid to
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Thus religious worship or religious doctrines, no matter how genera-
lized or ecumenical, cannot be part of the curriculum, although the study
of religion as a secular subject is permissible. However, if students and
their parents are Christian Fundamentalists, for example, would not the
teaching of the Bible as history or as part of a course in comparative
religion be inconsistent with and unduly burden the free exercise of their
religion? Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion in School District v.
Schempp,40  argued that "a doctrinaire reading of the Establishment
Clause leads to irreconcilable conflict with the 
Free Exercise Clause.
41
He pointed out that there was a "substantial free exercise claim on the
part of those who affirmatively desire to have their children's school day
open with the reading of passages from the Bible."
'42 The majority, how-
ever, gave little weight to this argument in the face of the strong establish-
ment clause claim.
Lower courts have considered a variety of free exercise claims, with
mixed results. In these cases, parents assert that the subject matter of the
courses taught,43 the books and materials assigned,
44 the manner in which
such courses are taught,45 and the imposition of certain school rules and
regulations48 unconstitutionally burden the practice of their religion. In
considering such claims, courts have generally attempted to strike an ac-
commodation between the right of parents to determine the religious up-
bringing of their own children and the power of school authorities to de-
parochial schools rather than religious socialization in the public schools. See, 
e.g., School Dist. v.
Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3248 (1985); Mueller 
v. Allen 463 U.S.
388 (1983); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. 
Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 
(1973); Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 
413 U.S. 734
(1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); 
Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
40. 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 309.
42. Id. at 312.
43. See, e.g., Roman v. Appleby, 558 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (counseling sessions 
with
student on matters of religion, sex, family relationships, etc., violated neither 
parents' nor students'
free exercise rights); Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), 
afd, 428
F.2d 471 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970) (sex education 
programs upheld over
parental religious objections on grounds of state's compelling interest in public 
health).
44. See, e.g., Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. (S.D. W. Va.), aff d, 530 
F.2d 972 (4th
Cir. 1975) (dismissal of parents' complaint seeking to enjoin use of textbooks 
allegedly offensive to
Christian morals); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974) (parents 
sought to have their
children excluded from health and music classes, and classes in which audio-visual 
equipment used, as
religiously and morally offensive).
45. See, e.g., Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270 (C.D. Il1. 1979) (compulsory 
co-educational
physical education classes in which "immodest" clothing was worn violated 
free exercise rights of
some students where state could not show compelling interest or that less restrictive 
means could not
be employed).
46. See, e.g., Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied,





cide which values are to be imparted and to which norms students are to
be socialized. In reaching this accommodation, courts have had to deter-
mine whether the parents' or childrens' practice of their religion was bur-
dened by the state regulation, and if so, whether the state's interest in the
requirement was sufficiently important to outweigh the burden.
The courts' emphasis on the establishment clause-striking down vari-
ous attempts to introduce religious worship or teachings into the public
schools-may teach children that the Constitution prohibits the establish-
ment by the state of a religion even if it is the wish of the majority of
those affected, and that the rights of minorities, who may have other ways
of worshipping, are protected by the Constitution. The lesson taught is
that government and religion are to be separate.
One commentator's analysis of the School Prayer cases suggests that the
practice of daily prayer in schools leads to religious indoctrination by rote
and ritual, a result which is not permissible where the child (or parent)
may not hold the religious belief being recited.4 This reading makes the
cases somewhat analogous to West Virginia v. Barnette, which prohibits
the coercion of an expression of a political belief."' But this coerced ex-
pression of a belief analysis grounds the School Prayer cases in the free
exercise rather than the establishment clause. It has been argued by others
that even if there were no establishment clause, courts should "treat com-
pulsory school prayers as interferences with the associational and free-
exercise-of-religion rights of the listeners, with the indoctrination element
supporting a limitation on school prayer activity."149 While I do not disa-
gree with this approach, it fails to address Justice Stewart's concern ex-
pressed in Abington. However, as noted above, the courts have been less
protective of free exercise claims, especially when the accommodation of
religious beliefs appears to foster the "establishment" of a particular reli-
gion. It may be that the two clauses can never be reconciled-that is, the
effect of "neutrality" under one clause may be to violate the other.
Political and Moral Values. Although the extent to which religious
socialization may be undertaken by school authorities has been sharply
limited by the courts,50 the constitutional limits on political and moral
socialization are less clear. West Virginia v. Barnette51 acknowledged the
47. Yudof, supra note 14, at 875.
48. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
49. M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION
IN AMERICA 215 (1983).
50. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
(per curiam); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see also McClean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F.
Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985).
51. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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right of school authorities to attempt to foster national unity and patriot-
ism in the schools, but limited the means by which they can do so. The
Supreme Court in that case held that the Constitution protects the right of
non-participation in a patriotic ritual that, in effect, coerces an expression
of belief. The First Amendment also appears to prevent the editing out of
the school curriculum particular ideas with a view to "prescrib[ing] what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion."" However, the removal of books and curricular materials from
the school library may be permitted under certain circumstances. The plu-
rality opinion in Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
District No. 26 v. Pico held that the Constitution would not bar school
officials from removing books from the school library that are "pervasively
vulgar" or educationally unsuitable.
53
The Island Trees case, which elicited seven separate opinions, demon-
strates the difficulty the Court has had in agreeing on the extent to which
the "special characteristics of the school environment" may permit consti-
tutional rights to be infringed. Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of
the Court, recognized a limited First Amendment right of students to re-
ceive information, at least in the context of removal of books from a school
library.5 In his view, for students to be prepared to participate in a politi-
cal system, they must have access to the "marketplace" of ideas and be
free to choose among ideas and schools of thought.
55 Access to ideas
"prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic,
often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members."
5 6
Justice Brennan noted, however, that the decision would not affect the
discretion of school officials with regard to adding books to their school
libraries.57 By grounding his decision in a First Amendment "right to re-
52. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872
(1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
53. 457 U.S. at 871.
54. Id. at 868. The right to receive information and ideas is "an inherent corollary of the rights of
free speech ...explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution," id. at 867 (plurality opinion), and stu-
dents too have these First Amendment rights.
55. Justice Brennan draws on precedent to demonstrate that the Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas, noting that the "marketplace of ideas" requires buyers as well as sell-
ers. 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (quoting Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)).
Justice Blackmun, in his opinion, also refers to precedent, noting that the Keyishian decision, in
"addressling] itself . . . to public education ...held that 'Itihe classroom is peculiarly the market-
place of ideas."' 457 U.S. at 877 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
56. 457 U.S. at 868.
57. Id. at 871-72. In an earlier case decided by the Seventh Circuit, the court there held that
although school administrators have broad discretion with regard to the school library, the Constitu-
tion would bar an administrator either from removing a book as part of an attempt to purge "all
material offensive to a single, exclusive perception of the way of the world" or from formulating a
library acquisitions policy on that basis. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300,
1308 (7th Cir. 1980).
1658
Vol. 95: 1647, 1986
Educating Youth
ceive information," however, he makes it difficult to distinguish logically
between the act of removing a book from the library and the act of refus-
ing to purchase that same book initially. As Justice Rehnquist notes,
"[t]he failure of a library to acquire a book denies access to its contents
just as effectively as does the removal of the book from the library's
shelf."58 Justice Brennan may have made the removal/purchase distinc-
tion for practical rather than legal reasons, however. In the case of a deci-
sion not to purchase, identifying the motive may prove more difficult than
in the case of a decision to remove. Or it may be that the judiciary would
be overwhelmed if it embarked upon reviewing decisions not to purchase
books.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, attempts to avoid the di-
lemma by constructing a narrower principle than the "right to receive
information." He would prohibit school officials from removing books
"for the purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or social per-
spectives discussed in them, when that action is motivated simply by the
officials' disapproval of the ideas involved."'59 While narrower in scope,
Justice Blackmun's principle will prove difficult to apply, as it will neces-
sarily involve courts in analyzing the motives of school officials.
It is unclear what message Justice Brennan's opinion in Island Trees
conveys to students. The Constitution gives students the freedom to choose
among ideas and schools of thought in their school libraries, but only to
the extent that school officials may not remove books already purchased
because they dislike the ideas contained in those books. And it is unclear
how courts are to distinguish a decision to remove a book that is not "edu-
cationally suitable" from a decision to remove a book to prevent access to
its ideas. Furthermore, there is nothing to restrict the school library's col-
lection from being selected with a view to a particular set of values the
authorities wish to convey. More importantly, a school is not constitution-
ally compelled to have a library at all, despite the fact that the school
library is the "principal locus" of the freedom "to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding."' 0 And, in dictum,
Justice Brennan even suggests that school officials may have absolute dis-
cretion in the classroom with regard to the selection of what is to be
taught and how, including the discretion to exclude alternative ideas and
perspectives.6" But allowing school officials to exclude totally a particular
58. 457 U.S. at 916 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 879-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 868-69 (citation omitted).
61. "Petitioners might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by
reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values." Id. at 869 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in
original). Justice Brennan's statement here is inconsistent with his reliance on Keyishian, which states
that "[the classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."' Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
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idea or ideology from the classroom would certainly run the risk of
"cast[ing] a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." 2 What lessons would
it convey to students if only one point of view or school of thought were
presented in the classroom? Would this teach "children to respect the di-
versity of ideas that is fundamental to the American system"?"3
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice Powell, set forth a very different view of education and, in particular,
the role of school libraries. In his view, "inculcating social values and
knowledge in relatively impressionable young people"
64 may be under-
taken by school authorities without any constitutional requirement to in-
clude the values and norms of others. "The idea that. . . students have a
right of access, in the school, to information other than that thought by
their educators to be necessary is contrary to the very nature of an incul-
cative education."16 5 Justice Rehnquist would not distinguish between
schools and their libraries, viewing the libraries as simply supplementing
the schools in their inculcative role.
These two conflicting views highlight the difficulty in determining how
students, who are not yet adults, can be taught democratic norms if access
to values and ideas of other communities and political systems is pre-
vented. The tension between the First Amendment's prohibition of censor-
ship of ideas and the desire to transmit to the young certain constitutional
values is illustrated by the question whether a student's right to receive
information includes a right of access to books or curricula that reflect
racial, religious, or gender bias. In that situation, the First Amendment's
right to free expression and access to ideas collides sharply with the
school's legitimate role of socializing youth to the community's constitu-
tional, political, and moral values of non-discrimination.
The reverse side of the coin involves the question of the extent to which
parents may constitutionally compel certain books and materials to be ex-
cluded from the school library or from the public school curriculum. And
to what extent may their children be exempt from having to read those
books or take those courses if parents object to the values or ideas con-
tained in them?
Absent a clear establishment clause claim, it is unlikely that parents can
demand, on moral or philosophical grounds, that certain books or courses
be excluded from the public school curriculum approved by school author-
U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). While Keyishian involved college teachers,
the law struck down by the Court covered more than just higher education.
62. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
63. Island Trees, 457 U.S. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
64. Id. at 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 914 (emphasis in original).
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ities.06 And absent a clear free exercise claim-that is, that a fundamental
tenet of their religion is being unduly burdened-67-it is also unlikely that
parents can exempt their children from certain courses to which they may
object.6" While early cases suggested that parents have a fundamental
right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their con-
trol" 69-1ocating this "fundamental" right in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment-more recent cases have suggested that this "pa-
rental right" is a very limited one.70 It thus may be that even if the Con-
stitution protects the right of parents to bring up their children as they
wish, that right may be given short shrift in the public schools as long as
Pierce protects the parental option of sending their children to private
schools. 1
66. See, e.g., Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.) (use of book in
sophomore English curriculum upheld against First Amendment religious claims), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 85 (1985); Mozert v. Hawkins County, Pub. Schools, 582 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (use
of textbooks upheld against free exercise claim); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp.
397, 289 A.2d 914 (New Haven County, Conn. C.P. 1971) (compulsory sex education course upheld
against free exercise and right of privacy claims); Todd v. Rochester Community Schools, 41 Mich.
App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (1972) (use of allegorical anti-war novel in high school literature class
upheld against establishment clause claim). But see Grosser v. Woollett, 45 Ohio Misc. 15, 341
N.E.2d 356 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio C.P. 1974) (enjoining assignment of certain books as part of the
curriculum unless parental consent obtained). Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972),
which indicated that a modern day Thoreau, who rejected contemporary secular values accepted by
the majority because of his philosophical and personal beliefs, would not be protected by the Constitu-
tion in a claim against state regulation of education.
67. See, e.g., Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982); Davis v.
Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974).
68. See generally Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is There a Right to
Have One's Child Excused from Public Instruction?, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 871 (1977).
69. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923). The Pierce Court identified the interest at stake as "the liberty of parents . . . to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control," 268 U.S. at 534-35, and noted that "those
who nurture [the child] and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations." Id. at 535.
70. The Supreme Court more recently identified the right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children as "cardinal," but cautioned that "neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are
beyond limitation. . . . [Tihe state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and
authority in things affecting the child's welfare . . . ." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166-67 (1944) (upholding state law applied to prevent child from passing out religious literature on
streets). The extent of the state's power in education was held to be quite broad in Baker v. Owen,
395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), affld mem. 423 U.S. 907 (1975), which declared, in a case where the
parent opposed corporal punishment, that the parent's right to direct the upbringing of his child was
not "fundamental." 395 F. Supp. at 299.
71. Compare Justice Brennan's comments in the context of the First Amendment's religion
clauses:
Attendance at the public schools has never been compulsory; parents remain morally and
constitutionally free to choose the academic environment in which they wish their children to
be educated. The relationship of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
public school system is preeminently that of reserving such a choice to the individual parent,
rather than vesting it in the majority of voters of each State or school district. The choice which
is thus preserved is between a public secular education with its uniquely democratic values,
and some form of private or sectarian education, which offers values of its own. In my judg-
ment the First Amendment forbids the State to inhibit that freedom of choice by diminishing
the attractiveness of either alternative-either by restricting the liberty of the private schools to
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III. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT
To what extent does the Constitution protect the right of free expres-
sion in the schools? Complete freedom of expression is inconsistent with
the schooling enterprise, which requires order and control. Thus, while
there is a constitutionally protected right of expression, this right may be
limited where its exercise would disrupt the educational enterprise.
Students' rights of expression. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,7 2 the leading case on the First Amendment
rights of public school students, involved several high school students who,
as a symbol to protest the Vietnam War, violated the school's regulation
prohibiting the wearing of black armbands while on school premises. The
school authorities argued that they could ban the wearing of armbands
because those with opposing viewpoints might become upset, resulting in a
disruptive atmosphere. The Court replied that although an "undifferenti-
ated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression,"73 school officials could limit expression if
they were able to show "that engaging in the forbidden conduct would
'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropri-
ate discipline in the operation of the school."'
74
The Tinker standard clearly provides less protection for free expression
in the special environment of the schools than is available to the ordinary
citizen. Moreover, because "substantial or material disruption of the edu-
cational process" could result from the reaction of others to the speaker's
message, the prohibition against permitting the heckler's veto to be the
basis for suppressing speech 5 does not appear to apply within the school
environment. The Court also failed to articulate any clear standards for
determining what showing is required in order to find "material and sub-
stantial interference."7 6 Since Tinker, one court has indicated that the po-
tential for psychological disruption from the distribution of a question-
naire surveying high school students' sexual attitudes and experiences for
publication in the student newspaper was sufficient grounds for sup-
inculcate whatever values they wish, or by jeopardizing the freedom of the public schools from
private or sectarian pressures.
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 242 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
72. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
73. Id. at 508.
74. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
75. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
76. Thus some lower courts have applied Tinker quite restrictively. See, e.g., Guzick v. Drebus,
431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971) (regulation against wearing of button
announcing anti-war demonstration upheld in light of potential disruptive effect); Hatter v. Los Ange-
les City High School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 1309 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (distribution of leaflets and wearing
of tags urging boycott of school candy sale to protest dress code not protected activity).
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pressing the survey, even though school officials could not "predict with
certainty that a certain number of students . . . would be harmed."' 7
Clearly, how school officials handle student newspapers and student or-
ganizations will also provide lessons for students in democratic values and
constitutional rights. School authorities have frequently required that
before any student-written material is disseminated, it must be submitted
for approval. Most courts take a restrictive view toward such prior re-
straint requirements, requiring them to be accompanied by adequate pro-
cedural safeguards.78 Because of the "special characteristics of the school
environment," 79 however, the standard applied to the public schools ap-
pears to be less restrictive than that applied to society at large.8 0 Judicial
protection for the First Amendment rights of students to express them-
selves through student newspapers, whether underground or school-
sponsored, exists only as long as the material being disseminated does not
substantially disrupt or materially interfere with school activities (with
wide latitude given to interpret such a standard) or is not obscene (and the
Supreme Court has permitted a lesser standard for obscenity when chil-
dren rather than adults are involved 81).
First Amendment protection for student associational rights also is lim-
ited in the context of the "special characteristics of the school environ-
ment." In Healy v. James,82 the Supreme Court noted that under the
Tinker standard "[a]ssociational activities need not be tolerated where
they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially
interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education,"8 "
although because the denial of recognition of a student organization is a
form of prior restraint, school authorities have a heavy burden of proving
the likelihood of disruption."'
77. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
Cf. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (questionnaire to identify potential
drug abusers administered by school authorities violated right of privacy).
78. See, e.g., Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973).
79. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
80. Only a few courts have held that school officials cannot require prior approval under any
circumstances without violating the First Amendment's prohibition of censorship. See, e.g., Fujishima
v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
81. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
82. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
83. Id. at 189.
84. The college in the Healy case had refused to recognize a "local chapter" of Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS), thus denying it the use of campus facilities, while various other student
organizations were permitted such access. Thus, Healy might be read to be concerned with equal
treatment; that is, if a college generally permits student organizations access to its facilities, it may not
exclude an organization based on the political or social views it espouses, although it could exclude all
student organizations. In Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), the Supreme Court also held that
once a university permits its facilities to be used by student groups, it may not exclude from the forum
any speech activity based on content-including religious speech-absent a compelling state interest.
The Supreme Court implied, however, that a state university may be a public forum, meaning that
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Teachers' rights of expression. If school authorities can control to only
a limited degree what students might hear from their fellow students, are
they equally limited with respect to messages that students might hear
from teachers? The question of whether a teacher's right of expression
may be restricted in light of the special demands of the school environ-
ment arises in two principal contexts. One is the extent to which the right
of the teacher as citizen to free expression is circumscribed by being an
employee of the school system.8 5 The other concerns the teacher as a pro-
fessional and his or her right to determine course content, the selection of
books, and the ideas and values to be presented in the classroom. Another
question, also not yet clearly resolved, is whether there is an independent
right of academic freedom protected by the Constitution."
8 It is these latter
two questions that are most relevant here.
The Supreme Court has never decided a case that squarely deals with
the issue of academic freedom in the classroom. Keyishian v. Board of
Regents notes that academic freedom is "a special concern of the First
Amendment" and that protecting the free exchange of ideas within our
schools is fundamentally important in promoting an open society.
87 Keyi-
shian also noted that "the classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of
ideas"' in our society. 88 Keyishian, however, involved neither the public
constitutionally it may not adopt a general prohibition against access to its facilities by student organi-
zations. In a footnote in Widmar v. Vincent, the Court indicated that it interpreted Healy v. James as
holding that a state university is an open forum per se for students, so that any attempt to restrict
students' access to buildings, facilities, and the various forms of communication on campus "must be
subjected to the level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint." 454 U.S. at 268 n.5.
Whether an educational institution is constitutionally obligated to provide a public forum may also
depend on whether it is a college or a high school. The Third Circuit, in ruling that the use of high
school classrooms for religious student group meetings violates the establishment clause, also noted,
contrary to the implications in Widmar v. Vincent, that the school district "would have been justified
in refusing to reserve high school property for use as a public forum for expression, and would violate
no constitutional constraints in doing so." Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538,
546 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 54 U.S.L.W. 4307 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1986) (No. 84-773).
85. In Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and subsequent cases, the Supreme
Court has indicated that under certain limited circumstances, a teacher's public criticism of school
administrators or criticism voiced privately to an administrator or to his or her fellow teachers, see,
e.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4 (1979), may be constitu-
tionally protected. However, if a teacher's statements can be shown to have impeded his or her per-
formance in the classroom or otherwise interfered with the regular operation of the school, the speech
might not be protected. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73. It is not dear whether First Amendment
protection would extend to teachers who voice their criticisms in the classroom or before a student
audience elsewhere on school premises. See, e.g., Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Nigosian v. Weiss, 343 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
86. The majority in Epperson v. Arkansas cites Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), as
holding that the due process clause prohibits arbitrary restrictions upon the freedom of teachers to
teach. 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968).
87. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
88. Id. (citation omitted).
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school classroom nor the teacher's right to choose the curriculum or to
teach in any particular way.89
While Epperson v. Arkansas comments on "arbitrary" restrictions
upon the freedom of teachers to teach and students to learn, the case was
decided on the basis of the establishment clause.90 The state's "undoubted
right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with
it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a
scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons
that violate the First Amendment." '91 Justice Black, in his concurring
opinion, sharply narrowed the idea that some notion of "academic free-
dom" is protected by the First Amendment.
I am . . not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school
children takes with him into the classroom a constitutional right to
teach sociological, economic, political, or religious subjects that the
school's managers do not want discussed. . . .I question whether
• .."academic freedom" permits a teacher to breach his contractual
agreement to teach only the subjects designated by the school author-
ities that hired him.
9 2
Justice Stewart, however, while allowing the state to determine whether a
particular subject should or should not be included in a public school cur-
riculum, declared that it would be constitutionally impermissible to pun-
ish a teacher for mentioning that there are other approaches to a particu-
lar subject. 3 Thus, while Justice Stewart believed that the individual
teacher has a right to decide on the pedagogical approach, it appears that
in Justice Black's view, the state should have complete control over both
the content of the curriculum and the way in which the teacher teaches
the curriculum.
Although lower court decisions vary significantly as to the extent to
which "academic freedom" in a classroom, with regard to subject matter,
content, and selection of books and materials, is constitutionally pro-
89. In Keyishian, faculty members of a state university in New York refused to sign a certificate
that required them to declare that they were not Communists, or that if they had been Communists,
that they had communicated that fact to the president of the university. 385 U.S. at 595-96. Thus, the
case involved the attempt of a state to exclude subversives from holding a university position alto-
gether, rather than restricting what was taught in the classroom. Although Keyishian dealt with uni-
versity professors, the case does not suggest that the holding might be so limited. The Court declared
the entire state law unconstitutional-not merely the amendment covering higher education.
90. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). In Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271
(1984), Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, seems to imply that Epperson was decided on
grounds of academic freedom rather than the establishment clause. Id. at 296.
91. 393 U.S. at 107.
92. Id. at 113-14 (Black, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 115-16 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tected,9 4 the cases, on varying grounds, suggest that the teacher has some
limited discretion to select the content and methodology, finding this right
to lie in the First Amendment's freedom of expression. 5 However, teach-
ers have no First Amendment right of free expression granting them abso-
lute discretion in this selection." In some of these cases, the judges appear
to be substituting their own judgment for that of school administrators or
boards of education as to whether the materials are "appropriate" for the
age of the children involved and the course being taught.
9 7
As noted earlier, dicta in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Island
Trees suggested that school boards have unfettered discretion to inculcate
community values through the curriculum. If this view prevails, the
teacher would appear to have no unilateral right to dictate the lessons
(especially value lessons) to which the student will be exposed. Some have
argued that there is no constitutional reason for permitting the teacher,
rather than the local school board, to be the one to choose the values to be
imparted to youth. 9
In discussing the student's First Amendment "right to know," Justice
Brennan states that the right to receive information and ideas "is an in-
herent corollary of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. . . .[T]he right to receive ideas follows
ineluctably from the sender's First Amendment right to send them
... .M If the student's right to receive information is a corollary of the
sender's First Amendment rights, we have made no progress in determin-
ing what rights of free speech the teacher has in the classroom. However,
the plurality opinion goes on to note:
[T]he right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's
meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political
freedom. . . .Of course all First Amendment rights accorded to stu-
94. Compare Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (teacher has right to
determine use of appropriate classroom materials that are not obscene or disruptive) with Cary v.
Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979) (teachers have no right to choose books banned by
school board).
95. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352
(M.D. Ala. 1970); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), affd, 448 F.2d 1242 (Ist Cir.
1971) (per curiam).
96. Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.), affd mem., 419 U.S.
1081 (1974).
97. See Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Burns v. Rovaldi, 477 F. Supp.
270 (D. Conn. 1979).
98. 457 U.S. at 869.
99. See, e.g., Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Deter-
mine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1342-43 (1976). But see M. YUDOr, supra note
49, at 216 ("the focus should be not on the constitutional entitlements of the teacher per se ... but
on the place of the teacher in the system of government expression").
100. Island Trees, 457 U.S. at 867 (emphasis in original).
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dents must be construed "in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment.
'"101
This seems to bring us full circle. Because the opinion suggested that
local school boards might have absolute discretion in matters of curricu-
lum in "the compulsory environment of the classroom,"10 2 the right to
receive ideas in the classroom may be limited to those ideas that the board
thinks will best inculcate community values. If the teacher's right of aca-
demic freedom is only a corollary of the right of students to receive ideas,
teachers may have no academic freedom in the classroom. The Seventh
Circuit, in a case decided two years before Island Trees, found that stu-
dents have a "freedom to hear" protected by the First Amendment, but
indicated that this right is sharply limited at the secondary school level
both by the immaturity and lack of intellectual development of the student
and by the responsibility of the school to inculcate social, political, and
moral values.103 If the classroom is the vehicle for imparting values, per-
haps it cannot also be an open "marketplace of ideas." Rather, any aspect
of "academic freedom" that has independent constitutional protection 0 ,
may exist only at the college or university level and not in public
schools. 105 Thus, for neither the sender (the teacher) nor the receiver (the
student) is there a constitutional right to ideas or viewpoints contrary to
those the school authorities wish to be promulgated. As Justice Blackmun
notes in Island Trees, this denial of access to other viewpoints "hardly
teaches children to respect the diversity of ideas that is fundamental to the
American system."108
101. 457 U.S. at 867-68 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)) (emphasis in original).
102. Id. at 869.
103.
[T]wo factors tend to limit the relevance of "academic freedom" at the secondary school level.
First, the student's right to and need for such freedom is bounded by the level of his or her
intellectual development. A high school student's lack of the intellectual skills necessary for
taking full advantage of the marketplace of ideas engenders a correspondingly greater need for
direction and guidance from those better equipped by experience and reflection to make critical
educational choices. Second, the importance of secondary schools in the development of intellec-
tual faculties is only one part of a broad formative role encompassing the encouragement and
nurturing of those fundamental social, political, and moral values that will permit a student to
take his place in the community.
Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980).
104. For contrasting views of the extent to which "academic freedom" is protected by the Consti-
tution, compare Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE
L.J. 841 with Goldstein, supra note 99.
105. Although Professor Yudof finds no clear academic freedom right of the teacher that is inde-
pendent of other First Amendment considerations, he argues that the focus should not be on the
teacher's right per se, "but on the place of the teacher in the system of government expression." M.
YuDxO, supra note 49, at 216. By this he means that the autonomy of the classroom teacher will help
to limit the government's power of indoctrination. Id.
106. 457 U.S. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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IV. THE REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURES IN THE SCHOOL
ENVIRONMENT
Institutional rules and regulations may be as important to the socializa-
tion of students as the formal curriculum. School rules that are concerned
with certain patterns of behavior on the part of both students and teach-
ers-hair and dress styles; smoking, drinking or the use of drugs; talking
in the classroom or the halls or talking back to teachers; tardiness; mar-
riage, pregnancy, sexual activity, or homosexuality-clearly inculcate par-
ticular values, as do the procedures for determining whether those rules
have been violated and what sanctions should be imposed. Some argue
these rules are essential to train students in behaviors appropriate to
higher education or to jobs, to prevent students from making decisions that
will adversely affect their education, to maintain order and prevent dis-
traction from the educational mission, or simply to teach "the necessity of
rules and obedience thereto" in society. 10 7 Despite our rhetoric that the
purpose of education is to impart to youth democratic values and political
participation skills, however, the real purpose of education at times seems
to be to create a passive, docile citizenry.1" 8 Schools may give discipline
and conformity higher priority than self-inquiry.109 Rules that encourage
silence and passivity, and promote lack of privacy, abuse of power, and
authoritarianism are generally accepted by the majority of students as the
way life is.110
To what extent does the Constitution constrain school authorities in
their application of rules and regulations regarding student behavior? At
issue is whether certain procedures must be followed before a student's
person or property can be searched for evidence of the commission of a
crime or a violation of a school rule, or before disciplinary action can be
taken for failure to comply with institutional rules and norms. Important
constitutional values are incorporated in our notions of procedural fair-
ness. To what extent does the nature of the school environment and its
107. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
108. See generally C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM 113-57 (1970) (schools' preoccu-
pation with order and control).
109. Id. at 145, 152-53. Social scientists have noted that teachers place greater emphasis on com-
pliance with rules than on other topics:
Second and third grade teachers consider the obligation of the child to conform to school rules
and laws of the community a more important topic than reading and arithmetic .... At the
same time that teachers emphasize compliance, they underemphasize the right of citizens to
participate in government.
R. DAWSON & K. PREWrr-r, supra note 31, at 163. See also Merelman, supra note 31, at 325-27.
110. See E. FRIEDENBERG, COMING OF AGE IN AMEmCA: GROWTH AND AcQuEscENCE 27-50
(1965); see also Noyes & McAndrew, Is This What Schools Are For?, SATURDAY REV., Dec. 21,
1968, at 58.
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special demands affect the traditional requirements of due process that
apply to citizens in our society?
Fourth Amendment Requirements. The Supreme Court, in New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 11 has held that because of the need to maintain order in the
school environment, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, while
unable to be dispensed with entirely, are considerably relaxed when ap-
plied to searches conducted by school officials. This exception for schools
once again points up the dilemma involved in trying to convey constitu-
tional values to our youth through an institution which itself places less
value on the particulars of some of these constitutional values112 and more
Ii. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
112. Constitutional privacy issues have arisen in the context of regulating students' personal ap-
pearance. Claims that a student has a constitutional right to govern his own appearance have gener-
ally relied on the First Amendment's freedom of expression or the right of privacy found in the
penumbras of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but they have also relied on the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue whether a male
student attending a public school has a constitutionally protected right to wear his hair in any manner
that he pleases has thoroughly divided the federal courts of appeals. Four circuits have voted affirma-
tively on this issue. Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
901 (1974); Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th
Cir. 1971); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970). Five other circuits rejected these
constitutional claims. Zeller v. Donegal School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1975);
Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974); Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 445 F.2d 932
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972); Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444 (6th Cir.
1971). To further illustrate the confusion, one circuit, having decided that high school authorities
could regulate the length of a student's hair without violating his constitutional rights, determined in a
later case that, where the student was a college student, the balance was in favor of the individual.
With the more mature student, the educational institution's role was diminished. Compare Karr, 460
F.2d 609 (5th Cir.) (en bane) (high school student), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972) with Lansdale
v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane) (college student), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 986 (1973). By contrast, the Ninth Circuit has stood firm against finding that either college or
high school students have a constitutionally protected right to wear their hair as they wish. See King
v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971); O1f,
445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972).
The Supreme Court has contributed to the stalemate by refusing to review such cases. However, it
did decide a case concerning a police officer who claimed that a hair length regulation violated his
First Amendment freedom of expression, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due
process and equal protection. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). The majority held that either a
"desire to make a police officer readily recognizable to the members of the public, or a desire for the
esprit de corps which such similarity is felt to inculcate within the police force itself" was a rational
justification for the regulation. Id. at 248. Whether and to what extent the Kelley decision is applica-
ble to teachers and students in schools remains a matter of speculation. Teachers are not employees in
a state military organization, although they are supposed to be role models for students. Students, on
the other hand, are neither analogous to police officers nor to teachers.
Some courts have suggested that a school-imposed dress code may not be unconstitutional, even
though regulations dealing with hair length may be, because clothes, unlike hair length, can be
changed after school. See Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Ark. 1972), which struck down a
regulation of hair length as a violation of the students' liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but which upheld a dress code, noting that the constitutional standard to be applied to dress
codes is lower because clothes can be changed. See also Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1285
(1st Cir. 1970); Copeland v. Hawkins, 352 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (E.D. Ill. 1973); Dunham v. Pul-
sifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Vt. 1970). Other jurisdictions have struck down school-promulgated
dress codes as infringing upon a personal liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment unless there
is a sufficiently important state interest to justify the infringement. Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F. Supp.
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on the safety and control of that institution. 1 3
Ordinarily, a search made of private property is "unreasonable" under
the Fourth Amendment if made without a valid search warrant."14 Even
when the circumstances are such that courts have permitted warrantless
searches (such as when it is necessary to prevent concealment or destruc-
tion of evidence 1 5), however, such searches usually require a showing of a
"probable cause" belief that the law has been violated. 16 However, the
Supreme Court, in balancing school authorities' "substantial" interest in
maintaining discipline against students' legitimate expectations of privacy,
has fashioned a less protective standard. In New Jersey v. T.L. 0., the
Supreme Court held that although the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures does apply to searches of stu-
dents by public school officials, such searches may be conducted without a
warrant or probable cause.11 All that is constitutionally required is that
the search be reasonable "under all the circumstances,"' 9 a criterion to be
determined by balancing "the individual's legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy and personal security" against "the government's need for effective
methods to deal with breaches of public order."'"2 A determination of rea-
sonableness in the context of a public school search turns upon a two-part
inquiry: whether the search is "justified at its inception" and whether the
scope of the search is "reasonably related" to the circumstances which
originally justified the search."' A search is "justified at its inception"
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn
up evidence that the student has violated either the law or rules of the
school. The search is of permissible scope when "the measures adopted
are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively




113. One recent study concluded that only eight percent of the nation's schools had a serious
crime problem. NATIONAL INST. OF EDUC., VIOLENT SCHOOLS-SAFE SCHOOLS: THE SAFE SCHOOL
STUDY REPORI -1-0 THE CONGRESS 2 (1978).
114. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
115. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
116. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973).
117. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
118. Id. at 743.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 741.
121. Id. at 744 (citations omitted).
122. Id. In the course of its opinion, the Court identified-but did not rule on-a variety of
related questions. While the petition for certiorari questioned the applicability of the exclusionary
rule to evidence in criminal juvenile delinquency proceedings obtained illegally by school authorities,
the Court's finding that the search was legal obviated the need to address the exclusionary rule.
Consequently, the Court expressly reserved judgment on that issue after noting a split in lower court
authority. Id. at 738-09 & nn.2-3. Because there was no ruling on this matter, the Court also did not
address whether, even if it should find that the exclusionary rule applied to illegally obtained evidence
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What are the implications of these differing standards for the socializa-
tion of students to our constitutional values, to the obligation to respect
other people's rights, and to attitudes toward invasions of privacy? As
Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence:
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the
meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing
citizenry. If the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of
arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot help
but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly. 1 3
The Supreme Court in T.L.O. has, once again, left unresolved society's
ambivalence between a concern for order and safety and the desire to in-
culcate in students an understanding of the constitutional rights of individ-
uals, but it has perhaps sharpened the dilemma for us.
The T.L.O. decision points up the Court's and our own confusion
about the nature of the relationship between school authorities and stu-
dents. Justice Powell, in this case as well as in Goss v. Lopez"" and In-
graham v. Wright, 25 emphasizes the special relationship between stu-
dents and teachers that "make[s] it unnecessary to afford students the
same constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool
setting. '126 In his view, the relationship between student and teacher is
akin to that between child and parent, and thus students should not have
the same expectation of privacy as the population generally. But the no-
tion that teachers are in loco parentis127 is no longer a viable one, which
used in criminal proceedings, the same evidence could be used by school officials in a disciplinary
proceeding.
Several more unanswered questions concern police involvement in school searches. The Court lim-
ited its holding to searches made by school authorities acting on their own and, although raising the
issue, did not intimate its opinion about searches in which the police and school authorities act to-
gether or where one acts at the request of the other. Id. at 741 n.5 & 744 n.7. Furthermore, the
standard articulated in T.L.O. turned on the Court's acknowledgment of the student's legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in her personal property. The Court noted that it is an open question whether or
not the same expectation of privacy in school storage space (e.g., lockers or desks) is in fact legitimate
and thus entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. While the Court did not answer the question, it
noted that lower courts are divided on the issue. Id. at 741 n.5.
123. Id. at 760-61 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
124. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
125. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
126. 105 S. Ct. at 747 (Powell, J., concurring).
127. Blackstone's Commentaries are frequently cited as the source of the in loco parentis doctrine:
[The parent) may. . . delegate part of his parental authority. . . to the tutor or schoolmaster
of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent
committed to his charge, viz.: that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer
the purposes for which he is employed.
1 W. Bi.AC-KsrONE, COMMENTARIES *557. Of course, the situation to which Blackstone was referring
was one in which a parent voluntarily employed a tutor.
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Justice Powell himself has recognized. 128 Compulsory attendance laws
have clearly altered the relationship between parent, teacher, and stu-
dent.1 29 Moreover, the large urban schools of today (or the consolidated
schools in rural areas) hardly permit the development of parent-like rela-
tionships on the part of the teacher. As one commentator has noted, what
is at issue in these cases is not a parental relationship between school
official and student but a law enforcement relationship, where school au-
thorities are acting to protect the safety and welfare of the general student
population.1 30 Of course, if the in loco parentis doctrine were relevant,
then the Fourth Amendment would be unlikely to apply even with re-
laxed standards.
Obviously, there must be a safe environment for learning, but as Justice
Stevens pointed out, the T.L.O. majority has failed to distinguish between
invasions of privacy for minor and for serious matters. "[A] search for
curlers and sunglasses in order to enforce the school dress code is appar-
ently just as important as a search for evidence of heroin addiction or
violent gang activity."13 1 Moreover, the T.L.O. opinion leaves it to school
authorities to decide what is reasonable, again conveying to students that
authority is arbitrary and stacked against them.
On the other hand, in this case and in the question of procedural due
process in the school setting, the "legalization" of dispute resolution in
schools may have brought a formality that belongs in the courtroom but
not in the classroom. The values of fairness, liberty, dignity, and partici-
pation protected by the requirement of formal rules and procedures are
juxtaposed against the nature of the relationship between teacher and stu-
dent in the educational process, potentially setting up students and teach-
ers as adversaries rather than as participants in the learning process.
Should the same strict requirements that apply to the search for evidence
in cases where criminal penalties will be imposed by the state apply in the
case of a school disciplinary code?
Due Process Requirements. The extent to which the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause prevents the infringement of a student's
128. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977).
129. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 741 (1985) ("[Plublic school officials do not
merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in
furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies."). A number of commentators
have pointed out that it is these laws that give the schools authority over the child and not delegation
by a parent of his authority. See, e.g., Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in
Public Schools, 59 IowA L. REV. 739, 767 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Buss, Fourth Amendment];
Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA.
L. REv. 545, 560 (1971); Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate
Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373, 384 & n.44
(1969).
130. Buss, Fourth Amendment, supra note 129, at 768 & n.191.
131. 105 S. Ct. at 763 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
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(or teacher's) liberty or property interest is yet another area that the Su-
preme Court has failed to clarify. Goss v. Lopez,1" 2 in a five-to-four opin-
ion, held that state-created entitlements to a public education are protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from even tempo-
rary deprivations. Thus, absent fair procedures for determining whether
misconduct has occurred, the right to an education may not be withdrawn
on the ground of misconduct. However, although the Court in Goss de-
cided that some process is due, the procedural requirements appear to be
quite minimal in the school environment. In the case of a ten-day suspen-
sion of a student for disciplinary reasons, Goss required only that the stu-
dent be given notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the
evidence, and an opportunity to explain his version of the story. Immedi-
ate removal from school may be justified in some cases even before the
hearing. The hearing itself may be simply a brief meeting between the
student and the school official minutes after the alleged transgression has
occurred.133 More stringent safeguards, however, may be required for




Goss clearly demonstrates the ambivalence of the Court regarding "le-
galizing" dispute resolutions in the schools.13 5 Justice White, speaking for
a majority of five members of the Court, balances the student's interest in
"avoid[ing] unfair or mistaken exclusion from the education process" '36
132. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
133. Id. at 582. But cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver's license re-
quires pre-suspension hearing to establish whether there is reasonable possibility that driver will lose
suit); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare recipients entitled to more involved
pretermination hearing).
As one commentator has noted:
Goss is surely much ado about very little. Given the miniscule opportunities it provides for a
student's defense and the automatic resolution of credibility issues against that student, Goss is
remarkable not for its innovation but for the fact that it was so long in coming, so vigorously
contested en route, so narrowly affirmed when it finally came, and so parsimonious in the
rights it recognized upon arrival. Such prodigious labor, one might say, to achieve so little.
Letwin, After Goss v. Lopez: Student Status As Suspect Classification?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 627, 637
(1977) (footnote omitted).
134. For example, more formal hearings could be required at which the student may be repre-
sented by counsel, confront witnesses against him and cross-examine them, and call his own witnesses.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 583-84.
Goss also held that arbitrary deprivations of liberty are prohibited by the Constitution. The Court
found that students have a liberty interest in their "'good name, reputation, honor, or integrity,"' id.
at 574 (citations omitted), and noted that the charges of misconduct, if sustained, could damage the
students' standing among classmates and teachers, as well as "interfere with later opportunities for
higher education and employment," id. at 575 (citations and footnote omitted), thus mandating proce-
dural safeguards.
135. This concern has also been raised with regard to the approach taken in the Education of the
Handicapped Act, Pub. L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§
1401-1441 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)), which is designed to protect handicapped children by mandating
due process requirements rather than substantive programs.
136. 419 U.S. at 579.
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against the school's interest in maintaining "[slome modicum of discipline
and order. . . if the educational function is to be performed." 137 He con-
cludes that the minimal requirements of notice and an informal hear-
ing-"rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of
misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school"" 3 -will not unduly in-
terfere with the educational process or prove too costly. The majority
notes, however, that "further formalizing the suspension process and esca-
lating its formality and adversary nature may . . . destroy its effectiveness
as part of the teaching process."' 3
The Goss dissent has a very different view of the impact of the decision
on the governance of schools, noting that "[f]ew rulings would interfere
more extensively in the daily functioning of schools. ' 140 Justice Powell,
speaking for the four dissenting members of the Court, defines education
to include the inculcation in students of the necessity of rules and obedi-
ence to them,14' noting that the schools bear responsibility for "shaping
the character and value judgments of the young. '14 2 Yet the issue is not
challenges to rules, but an opportunity to challenge the determination that
the rules have been violated, and violated by the student so charged. Jus-
tice Powell totally ignores the value of the requirements of due process as
a means of assuring that the rules are accurately and consistently followed
and that the student is not wrongly punished.
The real fear on the part of the dissenters is that formalizing proce-
dures invites a challenge to the authority of the teacher, thus undermining
the relationship between teacher and pupil necessary for learning to take
place. The dissenting opinion also gives greater weight to the responsibil-
ity of school officials to the impact on the education of the other chil-
dren,1 43 while the majority is concerned more with protecting individuals
(and groups' 44) against government arbitrariness. Thus the dissenters see
it as more harmful to the educational enterprise to impose procedural
137. Id. at 579-80.
138. Id. at 581 (footnote omitted).
139. Id. at 583.
140. Id. at 591 (Powell, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Dillon v. Pulaski County Special School Dist.,
468 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Ark. 1978), affd, 594 F.2d 699 (1979) (a goal of educational process is to
instill respect for authority).
142. Goss, 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting).
143. To manage the educational enterprise, some degree of order and control is clearly necessary.
But in some schools, order and control appear to be given undue emphasis. See C. SILBERMAN, supra
note 108, at 122-34. "The most important characteristic schools share in common is a preoccupation
with order and control." Id. at 122. As one writer noted, American high schools' "most memorable
arrangements are its corridor passes and its johns; they dominate social interaction." E.
FRIEDENBERG, supra note 110, at 29.
144. Studies have shown that minorities are suspended or expelled from school proportionately
more frequently than non-minorities. See, e.g., CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN OUT OF
SCHOOL IN AMERICA 308-45 (1974).
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safeguards than to punish an innocent individual (and have the wrongdoer
go unpunished).
In his dissent in Goss, Justice Powell posed a parade of horribles of
academic decisions by teachers that may require procedural safeguards:
grades, the passing or failing of a course, promotion."4 In Board of Cura-
tors v. Horowitz,'" however, the Court suggested that the requirements of
Goss need not apply to such decisions. In that case, the Supreme Court
was presented with the dismissal of a student for academic reasons rather
than for misconduct. Because, according to the Court, academic grades
and evaluations typically involve more subjective and evaluative judgments
than do the factual questions present in disciplinary decisions, such evalu-
ations are not readily adapted to procedural tools.' 47 Thus, the determina-
tion of "what process is due" turns on whether the disputed action is
deemed to be academic or disciplinary in nature. The Court in Horowitz,
however, did not necessarily say that absolutely no process is due when
the dispute is "academic" in nature, 4  but it is hard to think of a more
minimal process than that mandated in Goss.
Just two years after Goss, the Court held in Ingraham v. Wright,"4 9
also a five-to-four opinion, that although the administration of corporal
punishment for allegedly violating school rules implicated a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest, "the traditional common-law remedies are
fully adequate to afford due process."' 50 Thus, no advance procedural
safeguards were constitutionally required.' 5' The Court thus seems to be
145. Goss, 419 U.S. at 597-99 (Powell, J., dissenting).
146. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
147. Id. at 89-90. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1985)
(expressly following Horowitz, noting that academic decisions are "not readily adapted to. . .proce-
dural tools").
148. 435 U.S. at 85-86. The Court referred to the requirements of Goss for school conduct rule
violations and held that for a failure to meet academic standards, "far less stringent procedural re-
quirements" are necessary. Id. at 86 (footnote omitted). Because Horowitz-a medical student-had
been warned several times that her progress was not satisfactory and was even examined by seven
independent professors of medicine prior to her dismissal, those minimal requirements were met in
her case.
149. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
150. Id. at 672.
151. Id. at 676-80. Ingraham also held that the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable in public
school corporal punishment cases. The Court looked first to "traditional common-law concepts" to
determine the extent of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at
659 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968)). The Court found that the use of corporal
punishment as a means of disciplining school children dates back to the colonial period and continues
to play a role in public education today, and that professional and public opinion is sharply divided as
to the merits of the practice of corporal punishment. Id. at 660-61. The Court further found that the
"openness of the public school and its supervision by the community," state laws prohibiting excessive
punishment, and recourse against school officials in civil or criminal actions provide adequate protec-
tion for the student. Id. at 670-71. Thus, in the Court's view, the child is quite unlike a sequestered
criminal who may need constitutional redress for beatings at the hand of a jailer. The Court con-
cluded that there was neither justification in case law nor in the history of the Eighth Amendment to
extend its protection beyond criminals. Justice White argued in a strong dissent that the existence of
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retreating from its reliance on due process to resolve disputes and to mini-
mize governmental arbitrariness in the schools. While Goss required no-
tice and an informal hearing prior to even a brief suspension from school,
Ingraham says that not even this minimal process is necessary prior to the
imposition of corporal punishment. Those Justices concerned about esca-
lating the adversarial nature of schooling and its effect on the teaching
and learning process seem to have prevailed.
The primary concern of the majority in Goss appeared to be the possi-
bility of injustices; due process hearings are important because they might
uncover errors of fact. 52 As the majority opinion noted, the due process
clause would "not shield [the student] from suspensions properly im-
posed."1 53 A different reason may be postulated for mandating procedural
protections, however. Minimizing the risk of arbitrary governmental ac-
tion may convey a message even to those students who are not victims of a
mistake. Not only would due process hearings produce fairer outcomes,
but the outcomes might be more likely to be accepted as fair by those
students affected and by those students observing. Socializing students to
the view that they are respected participants in the educational process
may be an important value to convey in a democracy.
15 4
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions in Goss and Ingraham
considered the value of what has been called the "dignitary" theory of due
process, which "focuses on the degree to which decisional processes pre-
serve and enhance human dignity and self-respect. 11 55 While a number of
commentators have criticized the increasing "legalization" of authority re-
lationships, 56 others have suggested that such legalization may eliminate
arbitrary decisionmaking by public school officials. 1517 Schools are not as
Justice Powell envisions them, but are large bureaucracies that often give
students a feeling of distrust of authority. Due process requirements may
give some protection to students' interests in dignity, participation, and
various safeguards or state authorized redress is irrelevant to the Constitution's prohibition against
excessive punishment. Id. at 690-91 (White, J., dissenting). As long as there are any excessive beat-
ings in schools, those beatings are "punishments" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment and
subject to judicial scrutiny. It is absurd, he argued, to hold that "corporal punishment in public
schools, no matter how barbaric, inhumane, or severe, is never limited by the Eighth Amendment."
Id. at 692.
152. 419 U.S. at 579-80.
153. Id. at 579.
154. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502-03 (1978).
155. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REv.
885, 886 (1981).
156. See, e.g., Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School Superintendent, 1975
Sup. CT. REv. 25.
157. See, e.g., Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28
STAN. L. REv. 841 (1976); Yudof, Legalization of Dispute Resolution, Distrust of Authority, and
Organizational Theory: Implementing Due Process for Students in the Public Schools, 1981 Wis. L.
RE:v. 891.
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uniformity of treatment. Although Justice Powell believes that requiring
due process in the school setting would undermine the authority of teach-
ers and principals and destroy the relationship of trust necessary for the
educational process, the feeling that one is being treated fairly and being
heard may actually help restore trust.
Again, the question of what lessons are being taught is raised. For Jus-
tice Powell, the most important lesson is respect for authority and respect
for the rights of others.158 But there are other important lessons. The
principle of due process is deeply embedded in our constitutional values
and the Supreme Court has required due process hearings as a means of
protecting individuals against arbitrary governmental actions in many ar-
eas.159 Should not these values be imparted to students through their ex-
periences with the governmental institution which most affects and con-
trols their lives?
However, neither the dignitary1 60 nor the "instrumental" view"' of due
process seemed to prevail in Ingraham. Speaking only to the view that
due process serves the function of revealing mistakes-the "instrumental"
approach-the Court conceded that "the child has a strong interest in
procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment."1 6 2
Nevertheless, the Court held that a prior hearing would reduce the risk
only marginally and would impose too great a burden on school authori-
ties, who might even choose to abandon corporal punishment in the face of
such burdens.' 3
158. Goss, 419 U.S. at 593-94 (Powell, J., dissenting).
159. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (public employment); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prejudgment
attachments); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (tenured employment).
160. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502-03 (1978) (referring to "intrinsic"
value of due process).
161. See id. at 503.
162. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676.
163. Social science research does not tend to support the efficacy of corporal punishment. One
writer notes that "it is increasingly clear that most professional and public opinion [regarding corporal
punishment] is shaped more by hunch, folklore, and conjecture than by empirical evidence. There
appear to be no applied empirically based studies that support the use of corporal punishment." Rose,
Current Uses of Corporal Punishment in American Public Schools, 76 J. EDUC. PSYCHOLOGY 427
(1984); see also Hyman & McDowell, An Overview, in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION 4 (I. Hyman & J. Wise eds. 1979) ("no evidence to support its use or to prove its
efficacy as a tool of education"). Corporal punishment has been found to impede the accomplishments
of the five major developmental aspects of school-aged children. These include: (1) basic trust; (2) a
feeling of autonomy; (3) initiative; (4) industry or the ability to learn, work, and accomplish tasks; and
(5) identity development. Friedman & Friedman, Pediatric Considerations in the Use of Corporal
Punishment in the Schools, in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 337, 337-38 (I.
Hyman & J. Wise eds. 1979). Social scientists have also noted that corporal punishment tends to
produce socially disruptive and aggressive behavior. See Bongiovanni, An Analysis of Research on
Punishment and its Relation to the Use of Corporal Punishment in the Schools, in CORPORAL PUN-
ISHMEN'r IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 351, 364-65 (I. Hyman & J. Wise eds. 1979).
Corporal punishment also seems contrary to values we wish to inculcate in youth. It may suggest to
them that problems can best be solved through the use of physical force rather than through discus-
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VI. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment rights of free expression and free exercise of re-
ligion of an adult citizen in our society can be circumscribed only when
the State has shown a compelling justification which cannot be accom-
plished by less restrictive means. In the case of schoolchildren, however,
the courts balance First Amendment rights against the interests of the
school authorities in inculcating community values and in maintaining or-
der and control so that the educational mission can be accomplished, using
less rigorous constitutional standards in the balancing. In most instances,
the interest of the educational enterprise in socializing students to particu-
lar values or in order and control is given considerable weight, while that
of the individual schoolchild is given relatively little. The courts have
taken the same approach with regard to Fourth Amendment protections
and the procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The "special characteristics" of the elementary and secondary school
environment include the fact that students, being compelled to attend
school, are a captive audience, that the students are not yet fully developed
intellectually or emotionally,"" that the educational enterprise has an ob-
ligation to protect the safety of all students and to provide them with an
atmosphere conducive to education, and that the purpose of compulsory
education is to inculcate the social, moral and political values of the com-
munity (however defined) and, in particular, to prepare the young to par-
ticipate as citizens in our democratic society. However, the courts have
held that there are some constitutional constraints on the authority of
school officials in order to protect minority interests and some limited ex-
pression of dissent. The failure to so constrain would, in itself, be a form
of value inculcation and impart values contrary to our Constitution.
Courts have also held that the state is not disabled from promoting patri-
otism, nationalism, or other values, with the exception of religious values
sion, negotiation, or counseling.
164. Several establishment clause cases, in assessing the "primary effect" of state aid programs,
emphasize college students' maturity and skepticism versus high school students' impressionability.
Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (religious student groups may use university facili-
ties for meetings) with Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3rd Cir. 1984)
(religious student groups may not use high school facilities for meetings), rev'd on other grounds, 54
U.S.L.W. 4307 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1986) (No. 84-1773); and compare Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works
of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (permitting public aid to sectarian colleges); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971) (same) with Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985) (prohibiting
public aid to sectarian elementary and secondary schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
(same). This approach is taken by other cases in the area as well. Compare Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d
609 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972) (high school hair regulations are appro-
priate given the schools' mission and relative immaturity of high school students) with Lansdale v.
Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973)
(college student's right to wear hair any length he wishes is protected).
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or where the manner of inculcating values involves coercing the profession
of a belief. Only where establishment clause issues are involved (where
individual rights are not necessarily infringed) has the Supreme Court
taken an absolutist position. But the courts have permitted individual
rights to be diluted in the school environment.
In preventing access to alternative ideas and expression or in failing to
provide fair procedures, school officials subordinate the individual's consti-
tutional rights to the interest of others in the educational enterprise or to
the interest of teachers and officials in authority and control. In so doing,
the schools may be imparting values unacceptable to a democratic society.
As Justice Stevens pointed out in connection with the application of
Fourth Amendment requirements in the school environment:
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to expe-
rience the power of government. Through it passes every citizen and
public official, from schoolteachers to policemen and prison guards.
The values they learn there, they take with them in life. One of our
most cherished ideals is the one contained in the Fourth Amendment:
that the Government may not intrude on the personal privacy of its
citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstance. The Court's
decision today is a curious moral for the Nation's youth. 165
On the other hand, there is a legitimate concern that the courts, as well
as federal and state legislatures and agencies, will "overlegalize" the
schools and make it difficult for them to perform their educational mis-
sion. Some cases have clearly involved too much judicial intrusion into
educational decisions, such as where judges interpose their own notions of
the "appropriateness" of books and curricular materials. 6 In other cases,
there has not been enough judicial intrusion to protect the rights of indi-
viduals, as with in-school searches or the administration of corporal pun-
ishment. Here the values that are conveyed, I believe, are inconsistent
with those of the Constitution and a democratic society.
In trying to find an acceptable compromise between applying overly
intrusive constitutional standards and giving excessive discretion to school
authorities regardless of minority interests or individual rights, the Su-
preme Court, in several of its decisions, has succeeded only in muddying
the question rather than clarifying it. Thus lower courts, school adminis-
trators, and teachers will continue to struggle to interpret the require-
ments mandated by T.L.O., Tinker, Island Trees, and Goss.
The struggle to determine both what viewpoints are to be heard and
165. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 767 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
166. See, e.g., Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
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who decides, and the extent to which constitutional protections apply to
students as against the need of the educational enterprise for order and
control will undoubtedly continue. Although an increased role for the
courts is a matter of concern, the cost of less judicial involvement will not
only be in diminished protection for the rights of students, but also in the
value lessons this teaches students. Our constitutional values are concerned
with the relationship between the individual citizen and government, and
the curtailment of the constitutional rights of schoolchildren says much
about this relationship that may be the opposite of the lessons intended.
The importance to the educational institution of order and control should
not allow constitutional values to be subrogated or parcelled out in nig-
gardly fashion. And in determining the extent to which school authorities
should be constrained by constitutional requirements, courts should bear
in mind that the nature of the educational institution has changed. It is no
longer the institution pictured by Justice Powell. In that changed institu-
tion, where students and teachers do not know each other, where teachers
are often of a different race than their students, where a single high school
can have the same population as a small town, where in loco parentis no
longer is relevant, then constitutional protections become more important.
The school is not the extension of the parent, but of the government. And
among our most important democratic values are the disabling of govern-
ment from acting arbitrarily and from suppressing dissenting viewpoints
and ideas.
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